The transfer problem refers to the possibility that a donor country could end up better off after giving away some resources to another country. The simplest version of that problem can be formulated in a two consumer exchange economy with fixed total resources. Existence of a transfer problem at some equilibrium is known to be equivalent to instability in the case of two goods. This characterization is extended to an arbitrary number of goods by showing that a transfer problem exists at a (regular) equilibrium if and only if this equilibrium has an index value equal to −1. Samuelson's conjecture that there is no transfer problem at tatonnement stable equilibria is therefore true for any number of goods.
Introduction
Does a country's utility necessarily decrease when that country gives away some resources to another country? This problem is known in trade theory as the transfer problem and has led to a substantial literature. One aspect of the transfer problem is the characterization under simple assumptions (no trade impediments such as transportation costs and tariffs in particular) of those equilibria at which the donor country can improve its utility when giving away resources. The simplest model in which the transfer problem can be studied in the case of an arbitrary number of goods is the exchange model with two consumers and fixed total resources 1 . In the case of multiple equilibria, any one of the equilibria that do not give the highest utility level to consumer one can be improved by selecting one of those that yield a higher utility level. This trivial solution makes sense only if the equilibrium selection map is permitted to be discontinuous.
This formulation of the transfer problem requires that the equilibrium is regular with an associated locally continuous (in fact smooth) equilibrium selection map. The following results are then known: there are examples of economies that have regular equilibria with a transfer problem, i.e., such that a consumer (country) can be better off by giving away some resources [10] ; there is no transfer problem at tatonnement stable equilibria ( [12] , footnote p.29 and [11] ); tatonnement stability is not only sufficient but also necessary to prevent a transfer problem in the case of two goods [2] . Using the theory of smooth economies, I show in this paper that, at a regular equilibrium and for the equilibrium selection map defined by that equilibrium, there is a transfer problem if and only if the index value of that equilibrium is equal to −1. Utility level of the donor country then increases for any gifts that remain small enough to stay in the domain of the equilibrium selection map. This property extends to an arbitrary number of goods the characterization given in [2] for the case of two goods.
Section 2 of this paper is devoted to the main assumptions, definitions and notation. The geometric or dual formulation of the exchange model in the priceincome space (limited to the case of two consumers, fixed total resources and an arbitrary number of goods) occupies Section 3. This formulation is then used in Section 4 for a complete characterization by their index value of the regular equilibria featuring a transfer problem. Concluding comments end this paper with Section 5.
Definitions, assumptions and notation
There are ≥ 2 goods. The commodity space is R and X = R ++ denotes the strictly positive orthant of that space. The price vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p ) ∈ X (all prices are strictly positive) is normalized by the numeraire assumption p = 1.
++ denote the first − 1 coordinates of the normalized price vector p ∈ S. It comes p = (p, 1). The set of numeraire normalized prices is denoted by S = R −1 ++ × {1}. There are two consumers (or countries). Consumer i , with 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, is endowed with the goods bundle ω i ∈ R ++ . The endowment vector ω = (ω 1 , ω 2 ) ∈ R ++ × R ++ defines an economy. Total resources, equal to the vector r = ω 1 + ω 2 , are fixed. Let Ω = {ω = (ω 1 , ω 2 ) ∈ X 2 | ω 1 + ω 2 = r } denote the endowment or parameter space.
Consumer i preferences are represented by a utility function u i : X → R that satisfies the following assumptions that are standard in this kind of literature: 1) Smoothness; 2) Smooth monotonicity, i.e., Du i (x i ) ∈ X for x i ∈ X where Du i (x i ) is the gradient vector defined by the first-order derivatives of u i ; 3) Smooth strict quasi-concavity, namely, the restriction of the quadratic form defined by the Hessian matrix D 2 u i (x i ) to the tangent hyperplane to the indifference surface
The utility function u i is extended to x i = 0 by setting u i (0) = inf x i ∈X u i (x i ). Consumer i 's demand function is the map f i : S × R ++ → X where f i (p, w i ) is the unique solution to the problem of maximizing the utility u i (x i ) subject to the budget constraint p · x i ≤ w i . The demand function f i is smooth, satisfies Walras law (namely the identity p · f i (p, w i ) = w i ). Its (numeraire normalized) Slutsky matrix is negative definite. (For details, see for example [5] , Chapter 2.) Consumer i 's indirect utility function is defined byû i (p,
In order to define equilibrium, we introduce the vector z(p, ω)
− r that represents the excess demand associated with the pair
equality known as the equilibrium equation, is satisfied. The equilibrium manifold is the subset E of S × Ω defined by equation (1) . Letz(p, ω) ∈ R −1 denote the vector defined by the first −1 coordinates of the vector z(p, ω) ∈ R for (p, ω) ∈ S × Ω. It follows from the identity p · z(p, ω) = 0 (a consequence of Walras law satisfied by individual demand functions) that the equilibrium equation (1) is equivalent to the equationz(p,
The index of the regular equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E is then equal to +1 (resp. −1) if the sign of (−1) −1 det J(p, ω) is > 0 (resp. < 0). An index value of +1 is related to tatonnement stability in the following sense: local stability (for Walras tatonnement) is identified roughly speaking with the Jacobian matrix J(p, ω) having eigenvalues with strictly negative real parts; the product of these eigenvalues being equal to det J(p, ω), a tatonnement stable equilibrium always has an index value equal to +1. The converse is not true.
Locally defined equilibrium selection maps are associated with regular equilibria. More specifically, (p, ω) ∈ E be a regular equilibrium. It is then possible to apply the implicit function theorem to the equationz
where the unknown is the vectorp ∈ R −1 ++ . Then, there exists a neighborhood U of ω and a neighborhood V ⊂ E of the equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E and a smooth map s : U → S such that the map σ :
is a diffeomorphism between U and V (i.e., a smooth bijection with a smooth inverse map). For a neighborhood U of ω that is small enough, the map σ : U → V (resp. s : U → S) depends only on the regular equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E. The map σ : U → V (resp. s : U → S) is known as the local equilibrium selection map (resp. local equilibrium price selection map) associated with the regular equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E. For open sets U that are small enough, the maps σ and s are determined by the (regular) equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E. For details, see [5] , Proposition 7.2.
We now have all the necessary ingredients for a rigorous formulation of the transfer problem. Let us start with ω = (ω 1 , ω 2 ) and ω = (ω 1 , ω 2 ) in Ω be two endowment vectors (or economies.) By definition, consumer 1 gives away some resources when the economy moves from ω to ω if inequality ω 1 ω 1 (i.e., ω 1 ≤ ω 1 and ω 1 = ω 1 ) is satisfied. Definition 1. There is a transfer problem at the regular equilibrium (p, ω) if there exists an endowment vector ω = (ω 1 , ω 2 ) ∈ U with ω 1 ω 1 such that
where s : U → S is the local equilibrium price selection map associated with the regular equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E.
By definition, the transfer problem requires only the existence of one endowment vector ω with ω 1 ω 1 such that inequality (2) is satisfied. Remark 1. Definition 1 requires the equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E to be regular. This restriction is minor since the set of regular equilibria is an open subset with full measure of the equilibrium manifold E by [3] or [5] , Proposition 8.10.
The geometric approach to the transfer problem
The price-income space is the set S × R 2 ++ that consists of the triplets (p, w 1 , w 2 ) where w 1 and w 2 are the wealth of consumer 1 and 2 respectively. With total resources r fixed, the set H(r ) is the subset of S × R 2 ++ defined by the linear equation w 1 + w 2 = p · r . This is a hyperplane of dimension . This set is known as the ambient space. A set of coordinates for the ambient space H(r ) is given by the -tuple (p 1 , . . . , p −1 , w 1 ) = (p, w 1 ) ∈ R ++ . Then, w 2 is determined by the formula w 2 = p · r − w 1 .
By definition, the section manifold B(r ) is the subset of H(r ) consisting of the points b = (p, w 1 , w 2 ) that satisfy equation
This set is a smooth submanifold of H(r ) of dimension m − 1 by Proposition 5.4.1 of [4] . Therefore, for m = 2, the section manifold is just a smooth curve. Here is a direct proof of that property. The section manifold B(r ) is in fact closely related to the contract curve of the Edgeworth box, i.e., the set of Pareto optima associated with the fixed total resources r . Let P (r ) denote that set. A Pareto optimum then results from the maximization of the second consumer's utility u 2 (x 2 ) subject to the first consumer's utility constraint u 1 (x 1 ) = u 1 with u 1 ∈ [u 1 (0), u 1 (r )], the total resources being fixed and equal to r ∈ R ++ . Let x(u 1 ) = (x 1 (u 1 ), x 2 (u 1 )) be the Pareto optimum that solves that constrained maximization problem and let p(u 1 ) ∈ S denote the (numeraire normalized) price vector that supports that Pareto optimum x(u 1 ). For u 1 (0) < u 1 < u 1 (r ), the price vector p(u 1 ) ∈ S is collinear with the two gradient vectors Du 1 (x 1 (u 1 )) and Du 2 (x 2 (u 1 )); for u 1 equal to u 1 (0) (resp. u 1 (r )), the price vector p(u 1 (0)) ∈ S is collinear with Du 2 (r ) (resp. p(u 1 (r )) with Du 1 (r )). The set of Pareto optima is generated by varying consumer 1's utility level u 1 between u 1 (0) and u 1 (r ). This defines a smooth curve with two end points, the allocations (0, r ) and (r, 0). The section manifold now comes in with the observation that the point M(u 1
By definition, the positive orientation of the curve B(r ) corresponds to increasing values of the parameter u 1 . The curve B(r ) is separated by the point M(u 1 ) into two connected pieces, the arcˇ M 0 M(u 1 ) and the arcˇ M(u 1 ) M 1 . Equilibrium allocations belonging to the arcˇ M 0 M(u 1 ) (resp.ˇ M(u 1 ) M 1 ) yield utility levels for consumer 1 lower (resp. higher) than u 1 .
The derivative of the map u 1 → M(u 1 ) ∈ H(r ) is denoted by t(u 1 ). It represents a vector that is tangent to the curve B(r ) at the point M(u 1 ). The direction defined by the vector t(u 1 ) corresponds to increasing utility levels for consumer 1 along the curve B(r ) in a neighborhood of the point M(u 1 ).
The budget hyperplane A(ω) associated with the endowment vector ω ∈ Ω is the subset of H(r ) defined by equation w 1 = p·ω 1 in the coordinate system (p, w 1 ). In what follows, only the part of the budget hyperplane A(ω) that is defined for p ∈ R −1 ++ (i.e., for strictly positive prices) is considered. One sees readily that (p, ω) ∈ S × Ω is an equilibrium if and only if the point b = (p, p · ω 1 , p · ω 2 ) ∈ H(r ) belongs to the intersection B(r ) ∩ A(ω).
The study of the equilibrium equation (1) is equivalent to the study of the intersection of the curve B(r ) with the budget hyperplane A(ω) when ω is varied in Ω. The curve B(r ) captures all the non-linearities of equilibrium equation (1) . In addition, the curve B(r ) does not depend at all on the endowment vector ω ∈ Ω. This feature will come handily in the study of the transfer problem.
Let π j be the vector in R −1 with coordinates equal to 0 except for the j-th that is equal to 1. In the coordinate system (p, w 1 ) for H(r ), let e j (ω) = (π j , ω j 1 ). The (affine) hyperplane A(ω) is parallel to the vector subspace generated by the − 1 vectors e 1 , . . . , e −1 . The base (e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e −1 ) then defines the positive orientation of A(ω).
Let b = (p, p · ω 1 , p · ω 2 ) ∈ H(r ) be the point in the price-income space that is associated with the equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E. Let u 1 (p, ω) = u 1 (f 1 (p, p · ω 1 )) be the utility of consumer 1 at the equilibrium allocation
Regularity of the equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E is equivalent to the transversality of the smooth submanifolds B(r ) and A(ω) at b. The vectors e 1 (ω), . . . , e −1 (ω) and t(u 1 (p, ω)) are then linearly independent in H(r ) and the determinant 
Proof. It is possible to show directly, but after somewhat tedious and lengthy computations, that ∆(p, ω) has the sign opposite to det Dz Dp (p, ω) for any regular equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E, which would prove the Lemma. The following short proof avoids any computation by exploiting the connectedness of the curve B(r ) through its parameterization by consumer 1's utility level
Walras law for individual demands imply w 1 (u 1 ) = p(u 1 )·ω 1 (u 1 ) and w 2 = p·ω 2 (u 1 ). The pair (p(u 1 ), ω(u 1 )) is therefore an equilibrium and, actually, a no-trade equilibrium since
In addition, this equilibrium is regular since every no-trade equilibrium is regular by [1] or [5] , Proposition 8.2.
The budget hyperplane A(ω(u 1 )) depends continuously on u 1 . Therefore, the function
The function δ(u 1 ) is different from 0 for all u 1 ∈ [u 1 (0), u 1 (r )] since every notrade equilibrium is regular. Therefore, it suffices to check the sign of this function for any particular value of u 1 . A good candidate is u 1 = u 1 (0). Then, ω(u 1 ) = (0, r ) and the vector e j (ω(u 1 )) is equal to (π j , 0) for 1 ≤ j ≤ − 1. The point M 0 is in the horizontal hyperplane A(0, r ), a hyperplane with equation w 1 = 0 in the (p, w 1 ) coordinate system. Furthermore, the tangent vector t(u 1 ) to the curve B(r ) at u 1 = u 1 (0) necessarily points upwards. This implies that the -th coordinate of the vector t(u 1 ) is ≥ 0 for u 1 = u 1 (0) and cannot be equal to 0 because of the transversality property. This proves the strict inequality δ(u 1 (0)) > 0. Remark 2. Lemma 1 can be reformulated as saying that the index number of the regular equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E is the same thing as the intersection number in the sense of [9] , page 96 at the intersection b = (p, p · ω 1 , p · ω 2 ) (a point also denoted by M(u 1 ) in the earlier sections) of the submanifolds A(ω) and B(r ).
Remark 3. If the endowment vector ω ∈ Ω is regular (i.e., all equilibria (p, ω) ∈ E associated with ω are regular), there is only a finite number of equilibria [7] . It has been shown by Dierker that the sum of the indices over all these equilibria is an invariant equal to +1 [8] . This number is the same thing as the oriented intersection number of the submanifold B(r ) and A(ω) as defined in [9] , page 107.
It follows from the value equal to +1 of the oriented intersection number that the number of equilibria of a regular economy is odd. With this number equal to 2n + 1, n + 1 equilibria have an index equal to +1 and n have an index equal to −1.
Application to the transfer problem
The key issue is the relation between the transfer problem and the intersection number of A(ω) and B(r ) at their intersection point b corresponding to the regular equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E.
We now reformulate the property for consumer 1 of giving away some resources between ω and ω as a property of the hyperplanes A(ω) and A(ω ).
By definition, the hyperplane A(ω ) lies below the hyperplane A(ω) if the strict inequality p · ω 1 < p · ω 1 is satisfied for any p ∈ S. Note that the relative positions of A(ω) and A(ω ) are considered only above the price set S. It then comes: Proof. The condition is equivalent to p · (ω 1 − ω 1 ) < 0 for any p ∈ S. This readily implies that all coordinates of ω 1 − ω 1 are ≤ 0 and one of them at least is strictly negative.
We now reformulate the (local) equilibrium price selection map of Definition 1 within the setup of defined by the curve B(r ) and the hyperplane A(ω). The equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E is regular if the curve B(r ) and the hyperplane A(ω) intersects transversally at the point b = (p, w 1 , w 2 ) where w 1 = p · ω 1 and w 2 = p · ω 2 . Let u 1 be consumer 1's utility level such that M(u 1 ) = b. The vector t(u 1 ) that is by definition tangent to the curve B(r ) at the point b is not contained in the hyperplane A(ω) because of transversality.
For ω sufficiently close to ω and some sufficiently small neighborhood of b, transversality at b implies that the intersection B(r ) ∩ A(ω ) contains a unique point b in that neighborhood of b. This construction defines a map ω → b = b(ω ) that satisfies b(ω) = b. The composition of that map with the projection b = (p , w 1 , w 2 ) → p ∈ S is the (local) equilibrium price selection map considered in Definition 1.
The regular equilibra that feature a transfer problem can now be characterized as follows:
Theorem. The regular equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E features a transfer problem if and only if its index is equal to −1.
With the notation of earlier sections, it comes b(ω) = M(u 1 ). The arcˇ M(u 1 ) M 1 (resp.ˇ M 0 M(u 1 )) out of the curve B(r ) consists of the points of B(r ) that are parameterized by utility levels ≥ u 1 (resp. ≤ u 1 ).
If the intersection number of B(r ) and A(ω) at b(ω) is equal to −1, there is a neighborhood V ⊂ H(r ) of the point b(ω) = M(u 1 ) such that the points of the intersectionˇ M(u 1 ) M 1 ∩ V are below the hyperplane A(ω). Similarly, the points of
Let the open neighborhood U be the domain of the local equilibrium price selection map s : U → S defined at the regular equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E as in Definition 1. For ω ∈ U and ω ω, the hyperplane A(ω ) is below A(ω). The point b(ω ) is therefore below the hyperplane A(ω) and, therefore, belongs to the
The same line of reasoning shows that if the intersection number of B(r ) and A(ω) at b(ω) is equal to +1, then the strict inequality
is satisfied for any ω ∈ U with ω 1 ω 1 . The set of regular equilibria is partitioned into pathconnected components and the index is constant over each one of these components. It follows from [6] that the equilibria with an index value equal to +1 belong to just one such pathconnected component, the component that contains the set of no-trade equilibria. This implies that the transfer problem can exist only for sufficiently large volumes of trade.
A(ω)
A
Concluding comments
By transferring resources from one country to another, the goal is generally to make the receiving country better off. It follows from the theorem of this paper that quirks in the market mechanism render that goal impossible to achieve at equilibria with an index number equal to −1. Samuelson's intuition was that the causes for this misbehavior of competitive markets were somehow related with those that create instability. This intuition is correct since an equilibrium with index number −1 is unstable. Having an index value equal to +1 does not imply stability, but at those equilibria, the behavior of competitive markets does not interfere with the goal of the donor to make the receiver better off. This makes the concept of index value equal to +1 a possible substitute to the concept of stability. This is obviously true for the case of two consumers. The general case of an arbitrary number of consumers justifies further research.
From the perspective of comparative statics, it is noteworthy that the transfer problem can be observed only for sufficiently large volumes of trade.
